The company behind push.tt

Why this exists

Two-way radio has a property nobody puts on the box: anybody within range with a scanner hears your traffic. Digital radio moved the bar slightly — conventional DMR is decoded with equipment that costs less than a handset. Meanwhile every push-to-talk app that replaced radio moved the same conversations onto somebody else's servers, in the clear.

• On private and org channels, the key is created on member devices and never sent to us
• Our servers relay ciphertext they cannot read, and do not transcode encrypted audio
• We would rather ship a limitation we have documented than a badge we cannot support

What we do not claim

The same list appears on our security page, because a company page that omits it is marketing and the security page becomes the small print.

• No forward secrecy in v1 — a channel key that is later compromised would open past traffic captured on that channel
• Public channels are protected in transit and at rest, not end-to-end. The app labels which is which
• The AI assistant reads plaintext. It is off by default, quarantined to one clearly-marked conversation, and gated on consent
• Retention is the organisation's choice, and members are shown a notice in retained scopes rather than finding out later

If any of these matter to your deployment, ask us before you buy rather than after. We would rather lose the sale than argue about it in an incident.